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No. 107
Rising gas prices and concerns about green-
house gases have stimulated calls to build more
rail transit lines in urban areas, increase subsidies
to Amtrak, and construct a large-scale intercity
high-speed rail system. These megaprojects will
cost hundreds of billions of dollars, but they
won’t save energy or significantly reduce green-
house gas emissions.
Although media reports suggest that many
people are taking public transit instead of dri-
ving, actual numbers show that recent increases
in transit ridership account for only 3 percent of
the decline in urban driving. Also, contrary to
popular belief, rail transit does not save energy.
Many light-rail operations use more energy per
passengermile than the average sport utility vehi-
cle, and almost noneuses less than a fuel-efficient
car such as aToyota Prius. Peoplewho respond to
high fuel prices by taking transit are not saving
energy; they are merely imposing their energy
costs on someone else.
Rail transportation is also much more heavily
subsidized than other forms of travel. Where high-
way subsidies average less than a penny per passen-
ger mile, and subsidies to flying are even lower,
Amtrak costs taxpayers 22 cents per passengermile
andurban transit costs61centsperpassengermile.
Even if rail transport did save energy, spending
more money on rail will get few people out of
their cars. People who want to save energy should
plan to buy more fuel-efficient cars and encour-
age cities to invest in traffic signal coordination,
which can save far more energy at a tiny fraction
of the cost of building new rail transport lines.
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Myth 1: Rail transportation is inexpen-
sive
Reality: Rail transport is several times
more expensive, per passenger mile, than
driving or flying.
Intercity rail transportation and urban
transit are often billed as affordable alterna-
tives to the automobile or airlines. In fact, gov-
ernment-funded rail transportation is far
more expensive than more popular forms of
travel. To make them at all competitive with
flying anddriving, taxpayersmustheavily sub-
sidize intercity rail and urban transit.
Americans spent $1.03 trillion buying, oper-
ating, repairing, and insuring automobiles in
2006.1 In exchange, they traveled 4.55 trillion
passenger miles by car and light truck.2 That
works out to about 22.5 cents per passenger
mile. Roads also received $25.1 billion in subsi-
dies, mostly from local governments, which
adds ahalf pennyperpassengermile to the cost
of driving.3 Including subsidies, domestic air-
line service cost about 13.1 cents per passenger
mile in 2006.4
By comparison, Amtrak spent more than
$3billioncarryingpeopleabout5.4billionpas-
senger miles in 2006. This works out to 56
cents per passengermile,more than four times
the cost of flying. Also in 2006, America’s
urban transit agencies spent about $42 billion
on 49.5 billion passenger miles, for a cost of 85
cents per passenger mile, or more than three
times the cost of driving. (See Figure 1.)
Myth 2: We’ve subsidized highways and
airports for years; now it is time to subsi-
dize alternatives.
Reality: Since at least 1975, subsidies to
Amtrak and transit have been many
times greater, per passenger mile, than
subsidies to highways and air travel.
In 2006, Americans paid $93.6 billion in
tolls, gas taxes, and other highway user fees.
Of this amount, $19.3 billion was diverted to
mass transit and other nonhighway activities.
At the same time, various governments—
mainly local—spent $44.5 billion in property,
sales, or other taxes on highways, roads, and
streets. Thenet subsidy tohighwayswas $25.1
billion, or about half a penny per passenger
mile.5 Asmost airport costs are paid for out of
airport landing fees, subsidies to air travel
were even smaller: about 0.1 cent per passen-
ger mile.6
Transit carries only 1.5 percent of urban
travel and Amtrak carries only 0.2 percent of
intercity travel, yet transit and intercity rail
require huge subsidies. In 2006, subsidies to
Amtrak totaled just over $1 billion, or about
22 centsperpassengermile.7 This ismore than
40 times the subsidies to driving. Subsidies to
public transit totaled about 61 cents per pas-
senger mile, or 120 times the subsidies to
autos and highways.8 (See Figure 2.)
This imbalance in transportation subsidies
is hardlynew.According to available data, sub-
sidies per passenger mile to Amtrak and pub-
lic transit have been many times greater than
subsidies to driving since at least 1975.9
Like any infrastructure, rail lines, once
built, require continued and expensive main-
tenance and frequent rehabilitation. Such
costs threaten to bankrupt many of the
nation’s transit systems. The Chicago Transit
Authority is “on the verge of collapse” and
needs $9 billion to rehabilitate its rail ser-
vice.10 The Washington Metrorail needs $12
billion for rehabilitation but does not even
have the $1.5 billion it needs for “bare-bones
urgent priorities.”11 Boston is spending a full
third of its transit budget on interest on the
debt it incurred to rehabilitate its rail system,
while interest charges for New York’s subway
system are expected to reach $2 billion per
year by 2010.12 America’s taxpayers should
not be asked to support even more high-cost
transportation projects.
Myth 3: High gas prices are leading mil-
lions to turn to public transportation.
Reality: High prices may reduce driving,
but hardly any of that reduction is taken
up by public transport.
The U.S. Department of Transportation
recently announced that Americans drove 4
percent less in March of 2008 than they did in
the same month of 2007—the biggest drop in
driving since World War II.13 Meanwhile, the
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Figure 1
Cost of Transport per Passenger Mile, 2006 (cents)
Sources: National Transportation Statistics 2008 (Washington: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008), tables 1-37,
3-07, and 3-16; 2006 National Transit Database (Washington: Federal Transit Administration, 2007), “Capital Use”
and “Operating Expenses” spreadsheets; National Economic Accounts (Washington: Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2008), table 2.5.5; 2006 Annual Report (Washington: Amtrak, 2007).
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Figure 2
Transportation Subsidies per Passenger Mile, 2006 (cents)
Sources: National Transportation Statistics 2008 (Washington: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008), tables 1-37, 3-
27a, and 3-29a;Highway Statistics 2006 (Washington: Federal HighwayAdministration, 2008), table HF10; 2006 Annual
Report (Washington: Amtrak, 2007); 2006 National Transit Database (Washington: Federal Transit Administration,
2007), “Capital Use,” “Operating Expense,” and “Fares” spreadsheets.
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American Public Transportation Association
has eagerly noted that transit ridership in 2008
appears on target to exceed any of the previous
50years.14 APTAwantspeople toconclude that
auto drivers are switching to transit in droves.
In fact, transit ridership in the first three
months of 2008 was only 3.4 percent greater
than the same period in 2007. Since transit car-
ries only about 1.5 percent of all urban travel, a
3.4 percent increase has an insignificant impact
on auto driving. (See Figure 3.)
The 3.4-percent first-quarter ridership
increase equaled 86 million new transit trips,
or—since the average transit trip is about 5.3
miles long—about 455 million transit passen-
germiles. That is less than3percent of the15.4
billion decline in urban auto passenger miles.
That means 97 percent of the decline repre-
sentedpeople doing something other than rid-
ing transit—perhaps carpooling, trip chaining,
or simply forgoing travel.
Ironically, APTA data for March 2008—the
month with the 4 percent decline in driving—
actually show a slight decrease in ridership
from 2007. Transit is clearly not making a dif-
ference for most people who are affected by
high fuel prices. This is because transit sys-
tems cannot take people where they want to
go, when theywant to go there—which is espe-
cially a problem for inflexible rail systems.
Myth 4: Intercity rail and transit
improvements can get a lot of people out
of their cars.
Reality: Despite high gas prices and huge
subsidies to transit and intercity rail,
Europeans drive almost as much as
Americans.
Europe’s experience offers no hope that
huge investments in intercity rail orurban tran-
sitwill get a lotofpeople to stopdriving, even in
the face of high fuel prices. Instead, the main
long-termeffect of high fuel prices is to encour-
age people to buy more fuel-efficient cars.
Thanks to high fuel taxes, Europeans have
paid $5 to $6 per gallon for fuel for many
4
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Figure 3
Transit versus Driving (billions of passenger miles)
Sources: Traffic Volume Trends: March 2008 (Washington: Federal Highway Administration, 2008), p. 3; Transit
Ridership Report: First Quarter 2008 (Washington: American Public Transportation Association, 2008), p. 1.
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years. Meanwhile, University of Paris trans-
port economist Rémy Prud’homme esti-
mates that countries in the European Union
spend 68 billion euros a year subsidizing
intercity rail and a similar amount subsidiz-
ing urban transit.15 Despite these taxes and
subsidies, the differences between American
and European travel patterns are slight.
In 2000, residents of the European Union
used rail or bus for 14.9 percent of all their
travel, while Americans used those modes for
just 4.3 percent of travel. Americans flew for
10.9 percent of their travel, while Europeans
only went by air for 5.9 percent of travel. That
means Americans drove for about 85 percent
of travel, while Europeans drove for just over
79 percent—hardly a major difference, and
one that can largely be explained by Europe’s
lower per-capita incomes.16 (See Figure 4.)
Even as planners tell Americans they
should be more like Europe, Europe is look-
ing more like the United States. Between
1970 and 2000, rail’s and bus’s share of trav-
el in the European Union declined from 23.2
to 14.9 percent. Newly deregulated airlines
captured much of the difference, while the
auto’s share of travel increased from 75.2 to
79.2 percent.17 European planners predict
that rail and bus’s combined share will con-
tinue to decline between 2000 and 2030.18 If
subsidies of roughly 100 billion euros ($160
billion) a year—approximately what the U.S.
spends each year (mostly out of user fees) on
its entire roadway system—are not enough to
increase rail and transit’s share of travel, then
how much would it take? Despite the huge
subsidies, rail travel in the European Union
grew by only 38 percent between 1970 and
2000. Despite high fuel taxes, auto driving
grew by 140 percent in the same time period.
(See Figure 5.)
Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor is the only
example of high-speed rail service in theUnited
States, and Amtrak runs more than 20 trains a
day each way between New York and
Washington. Amtrak carries almost as many
5
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Figure 4
U.S. and EU Transportation Modes, 2000 (percent)
Sources: Panorama of Transport: Statistical Overview of Transport in the European Union, part 2 (Luxembourg:
European Communities, 2003), p. 89; National Transportation Statistics 2008 (Washington: Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, 2008), table 1-37.
Note: Rail and bus numbers include both intercity and urban rail and bus services.

	


	 

	

	
United States European Union
112338 Cato Bp107_Rev.qxp  10/8/08  11:18 AM  Page 5
6





 	  

   
Figure 5
EU Passenger Kilometers per Year, by Mode (trillions)
Source: Panorama of Transport: Statistical Overview of Transport in the European Union, part 2 (Luxembourg:
European Communities, 2003), p. 89.
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Figure 6
Energy Consumption per Passenger Mile, by Transportation Type (BTU)
Sources: National Transportation Statistics 2008 (Washington: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008), tables 4-18
and 4-21; 2006 National Transit Database (Washington: Federal Transit Administration, 2007), “Energy
Consumption” spreadsheet; Davis and Diegel, Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 26 (Oak Ridge, TN: U.S.
Department of Energy, 2007), table 2.13.
Notes: The energy costs of various forms of transportation are shown in British thermal units (BTUs), a standard mea-
sure of energy consumption. “SUVs” includes pick ups and full-size vans. “TB” is electric trolley buses, “LR” light rail,
“HR” heavy rail (elevated and subway), and “CR” commuter rail.All data are for 2006 exceptAmtrak which is for 2005,
and 2035 Cars which is projected based on requirements of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
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riders in this corridoras theairlines, butonly14
percent of total travel in this corridor.19 High-
speed rail does more to reduce the profitability
of airlines than relieve crowded highways.
Myth 5: Rail transport saves energy.
Reality: Getting people to drive more
fuel-efficient cars will save far more ener-
gy than building rail transit.
Contrary to popular belief, neither public
transit nor intercity rail saves much energy.
Buses consume about asmuch energy per pas-
senger mile as light trucks (pick ups, vans, and
sport utility vehicles). Light rail consumes
about as much as the average passenger car.
Amtrak is only a little better than the average
domestic airline flight.
Heavy rail (subway and elevated) and com-
muter rail do a little better than automobiles
and airlines. But neither is as energy efficient
as the most fuel-efficient cars, such as the
Toyota Prius. (See Figure 6.)
Unlike transit, which generally has been
getting less energy efficient over time, auto-
mobiles are getting more energy efficient.20
Under the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007, this trendwill continue so that, by
2035, the average auto on the road will con-
sume just 2,500BTUsper passengermile—less
thanAmtrakor anyurban transitmode today.
The energy efficiency of proposed new rail
projectsmustbe comparednot against today’s
autos but against those of the future, when
those rail projects will actually be in service.
These numbers do not even count the exor-
bitant energy cost of constructing rail lines.
Because rail lines tend to move far fewer people
than highways, this construction cost is much
higher per passenger mile. For example, plan-
ners projected that operating a new light-rail
line inPortland,Oregon,wouldsavea littleener-
gyeachyear,but itwill take172yearsof that sav-
ings topay for the energy cost of construction.21
In general, people who ride public transit or
intercity rail do not save energy somuch as they
make other people pay their energy bills.
Myth 6: Rail transport can reduce green-
house gas emissions.
Reality: Diesel-powered transport emits
as much greenhouse gases per passenger
mile as driving, and electric power only
reduces emissions if the electricity does
not come from burning fossil fuels.
Since diesel buses and trains are no more
energy efficient than autos, it is no surprise
that they produce as much or more green-
house gas emissions per passengermile.Where
electric power is generated by burning fossil
fuels, electric rail transport is also a major gen-
erator of greenhouse gases. As with energy,
moving consumers tomore fuel-efficient auto-
mobileswill domore to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions thanbuilding rail lines. Even if some
forms of rail transit produced slightly less
greenhouse gas than fuel-efficient cars, when
the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions during
construction are counted, the savings are too
small to be worthwhile. (See Figure 7.)
Electric-poweredtransitproduces fewgreen-
housegaseswhentheelectricity is fromnuclear,
hydro, orother renewable sources. But inplaces
such as Dallas, Denver, and Washington, D.C.,
wheremost electricity comes fromburning fos-
sil fuels, rail transit generates more greenhouse
gases than driving today and much more than
driving in the future. (See Figure 8.)
If the United States is going to significant-
ly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, Mc-
Kinsey & Company says it should invest in
technologies that will reduce emissions at a
cost of no more than $50 per ton of CO2–
equivalent gases. In a report sponsored by sev-
eral corporations (including Shell and PG&E)
and nonprofit organizations (including En-
vironmental Defense and Natural Resources
Defense Council), McKinsey notes, for exam-
ple, that cars built with lighter-weight materi-
als can reduce emissions and actually save
money in the long run.22
By comparison, a proposed light-rail line in
Portland, Oregon, where most electricity comes
fromrenewablesources, isexpectedtocostmore
than $7,600 per ton of reduced greenhouse gas-
es.23 Converting diesel buses to biodiesel at the
rate of $200 a ton or buying hybrid buses at
$1,300 a ton costs less than building light rail
but stillmuchmore than $50 per ton.24
7
Transit riders
are not saving
energy; they are
merely making
others pay their
energy bills.
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Transit agencies in regions with renewable
sources of electricity will find that electric
trolley buses will do far more to reduce green-
house gas emissions at a far lower cost than
rail transit. For example, Seattle trolley buses
emit less than a third as much CO2 per pas-
senger mile as a Toyota Prius, and—unlike
rail—the emissions during installation of the
trolley wires are negligible.
Cities that genuinely want to reduce green-
house gases should invest in cost-effective con-
gestion reduction techniques such as traffic
signal coordination. The Federal Highway
Administration says that three out of four traf-
fic signals are not properly coordinated with
nearby signals.25 A 2003 signal coordination
project in San Jose that cost $500,000 saved
motorists an estimated 471,000 gallons of fuel
per year.26 At $2 per gallon, the savings more
thanpaid for theproject in the first year, andat
19.5 pounds of CO2 per gallon, the project
reduced greenhouse gas emissions at a savings
of around $200 per ton.
Given that the vast majority of American
travel is by car, increasing fuel economy by
building lighter autos and reducing traffic
congestion will do far more to reduce green-
house gas emissions than transit improve-
ments—andat anet savings rather than ahuge
cost. (See Figure 9.)
Myth 7: Rail transport helps low-income
people.
Reality: Financial troubles with rail pro-
jects have forced many transit agencies to
reduce bus service to low-income neigh-
borhoods.
More than 90 percent of American fami-
lies have at least one automobile. Rail propo-
nents often claim that new rail construction
8
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Figure 7
CO2 Emissions, by Vehicle Type (pounds per passenger mile)
Source:National Transportation Statistics 2008 (Washington: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008), tables 4-18 and 4-
21; 2006 National Transit Database (Washington: Federal Transit Administration, 2007), “Energy Consumption” spread-
sheet; Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 26 (Oak Ridge, TN: U.S. Department of Energy, 2007), table 2.13.
Notes: “SUVs” includes pick ups and full-size vans. “TB” is electric trolley buses, “LR” light rail, “HR” heavy rail
(elevated and subway), and “CR” commuter rail.All data are for 2006 exceptAmtrak which is for 2005, and 2035 Cars
which is projected based on requirements of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Conversions to CO2
are based on Energy Information Administration, “Fuel and Energy Emission Coefficients,” tinyurl.com/pqubq.
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Figure 9
Cost per Ton of CO2 Abated (dollars)
Sources: See calculations in Randal O’Toole, “Does Rail Transit Save Energy or Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions?”
Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 615, April 14, 2008, p. 17.
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Figure 8
CO2 Emissions from Rail Transit in Selected Cities (pounds per passenger mile)
Sources: SUVs and cars from Stacy C. Davis and Susan W. Diegel, Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 26 (Oak
Ridge, TN: Department of Energy, 2007), tables 2.13 and 2.14; rail transit from 2006 National Transit Database
(Washington: Federal Transit Administration, 2007), Energy Consumption spreadsheet; see Randal O’Toole, “Does
Rail Transit Save Energy and Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions?” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 615, April 14,
2008, for detailed calculations.
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can providemobility for those families whose
incomes are so low that they cannot afford a
car or the current high fuel prices. In fact,
even with subsidies, rail is a high-cost luxury
that mainly serves the well-to-do.
Intercity buses carry more than 25 times as
many passenger miles each year to more desti-
nations than Amtrak at about half the fares
and without subsidies.27 Some low-income
passengers may ride Amtrak. But most of the
travel in the Northeast Corridor, California,
and other short-distance corridors is business
travel;muchof the long-distance travel is vaca-
tioners.
Meanwhile, new rail transit projects contin-
ue to suffer large cost overruns, require transit
agencies tomakehighmortgage payments, and
imposehuge long-termrepair andmaintenance
costs. These problems almost inevitably force
transit agencies to cutbus service to low-income
and transit-dependent neighborhoods.
LosAngelesbusridershipwasgrowingrapid-
lyuntil the countybeganbuilding rail transit. In
1985, when the Los Angeles County Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority started construction of
rail transit lines, cost overruns forced it to cut
bus service and raise fares, leading to a 17 per-
cent decline in ridership by 1995. In 1994, the
NAACPsuccessfully sued the agency for cutting
service to low-income, minority neighborhoods
in order to finance rail lines to white middle-
class neighborhoods.28 Since a 1996 court order
restored bus service (and curtailed rail construc-
tion), bus ridership has recovered. To date, bil-
lions of dollars have been invested in nearly 500
miles of Los Angeles-area rail transit lines.
Despite having 80 miles of light rail and sub-
ways and hundreds of miles of commuter-rail
lines, rail ridership has never equaled the loss in
bus ridership between 1985 and 1995. (See
Figure 10.)
A similar lawsuit has been filed in the San
Francisco Bay area. “The Bay Area has two ‘sep-
arate and unequal’ transit systems: an expand-
ing state-of-the-art rail system for predomi-
nantly white, relatively affluent communities
and a shrinking bus system for low-income
peopleof color,” saidoneof the attorneys in the
10
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Figure 10
Los Angeles Transit Ridership
Source: 2006 National Transit Database (Washington: Federal Transit Administration, 2007), “Service Supplied and
Consumed” spreadsheet for indicated years.
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lawsuit.29 Many other cities have cut bus service
to low-income neighborhoods following rail
construction to middle-class suburbs, includ-
ing Portland, Sacramento, San Jose, and Wash-
ington, D.C. In fact, transit agencies in nearly
half the cities with rail service carried fewer rid-
ers in 2005 than they did in themid-1980s, and
transit has lost market share to the automobile
in nearly all other rail cities.
Myth 8: Rail transport promotes economic
development.
Reality: Rail transport has not been a cat-
alyst to economic development, but it has
been a catalyst to subsidies to economic
development.
Proponentsofrail transportarguethat itpro-
motes economic development. The Federal
TransitAdministrationaskedRobertCervero, of
the University of California, Berkeley, Planning
School, and Samuel Seskin, of rail consulting
firmParsons-Brinckerhoff, toexaminethisques-
tion. They found that any new development
around rail transport is a zero-sum game for
urban areas. “Urban rail transit investments,”
they said, “rarely ‘create’ new growth, but more
typically redistribute growth that would have
takenplacewithout the investment.”30
Portland, Oregon, is often cited as an exam-
ple of a place where rail transit has stimulated
new development. When Portland opened its
first light-rail line in1986, it rezoned landalong
the line for high-density, mixed-use, transit-ori-
ented developments. Ten years later, not a sin-
gle newdevelopmentof this sort hadbeenbuilt
along the line.
11
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Figure 11
Development Subsidies along Transit Lines, Portland, OR
Source: Portland Development Commission, “Urban Renewal History Appendix,” 2006, tinyurl.com/yo2zde.
Notes: Most of Portland’s active urban-renewal districts have been drawn to provide financial support for real estate
development along light-rail and streetcar lines. Numbers are millions of dollars of authorized TIF subsidies. The River
(RD, also called the Pearl District), South Parkblocks (SP), and North Macadam (NM, or South Waterfront) districts
are on the streetcar line. Interstate (IS) is on the yellow light-rail line; Airport (AP) is on the red line; Gateway (GW)
is on the blue line; and Lents (LT) is on the green line. Convention Center (CC) and Downtown (DT) are on all light-
rail lines. Central Eastside (CE) is on a proposed streetcar line.
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“It is a myth to think that the market will
take care of development along transit corri-
dors,” said city commissioner Charles Hales at
the time.31 He persuaded the rest of the city
council to subsidize such development with
property tax waivers. Since then, the city has
also offered below-market land sales and tax-
increment financing (TIF) to developers in rail
corridors. The TIF subsidies alone total more
than $1.7 billion, including $665 million along
the city’s streetcar line andnearly a billionmore
along its light-rail lines.32 (See Figure 11.)
Today, Hales works for a consulting firm
that is trying to persuade other cities to build
rail transit lines. Portland’s “streetcar line has
sparked more than $1.5 billion (and growing)
in new development,” Hales tells those cities,
conveniently forgetting about the subsidies
that he initiated.33 Since tax-increment financ-
ing diverts money that would otherwise go to
schools, police, fire, and other services, those
services have seen major budget cuts as
Portland gives more subsidies to developers.34
Conclusion
Rail transit and intercity high-speed rail are
expensive programs that require huge subsidies
andprovide little in thewayof energy savingsor
other environmental or social benefits. Rail
transit does not attractmanypeople away from
driving, and intercity high-speed rail mainly
takes business from the airlines. Federal, state,
or local officials who are truly interested in sav-
ing energy and reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions should find more cost-effective solutions
than new rail projects.
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